Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the "rm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) ( Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155}1177) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key variables in the contracting environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved "rm heterogeneity. Moreover, after 0304-405X/99/$ -see front matter 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 3 0 4 -4 0 5 X ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 2 5 -2 controlling both for observed "rm characteristics and "rm "xed e!ects, we cannot conclude (econometrically) that changes in managerial ownership a!ect "rm performance.
Introduction
Since Berle and Means (1932) , the con#ict between managers and shareholders has been studied extensively by researchers seeking to understand the nature of the "rm. When shareholders are too di!use to monitor managers, corporate assets can be used for the bene"t of managers rather than for maximizing shareholder wealth. It is well known that a solution to this problem is to give managers an equity stake in the "rm. Doing so helps to resolve the moral hazard problem by aligning managerial interests with shareholders' interests. Therefore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that managers with small levels of ownership fail to maximize shareholder wealth because they have an incentive to consume perquisites. In a similar fashion, some commentators have decried low levels of managerial ownership in U.S. corporations, and the theme has even appeared in discussions by compensation specialists and boards of directors.
In this paper, we propose an equilibrium interpretation of the observed di!erences in ownership structures across "rms. Rather than interpret low ownership levels as per se evidence of suboptimal compensation design, we argue that the compensation contracts observed in the data are endogenously determined by the contracting environment, which di!ers across "rms in both observable and unobservable ways. In particular, low levels of managerial ownership might well be the optimal incentive arrangement for the "rm if the scope for perquisite consumption (or more generally, the severity of the moral hazard problem for managers) happens to be low for that "rm. We do not deny the importance of agency problems between stockholders and managers, but rather emphasize the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in the contracting environment across "rms.
We begin by examining the observable determinants of managerial ownership. This investigation builds upon Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , who use crosssectional data to show that the level of managerial ownership is determined by the riskiness of the "rm, measured by the volatility of the stock price. They argue that the scope for moral hazard is greater for managers of riskier "rms, which therefore means that those managers must have greater ownership stakes to align incentives. They also point out that riskiness makes it costlier for managers to hold nondiversi"ed portfolios (assuming that equity holdings in the "rm are not easily hedged), so the relation between managerial ownership and nondiversi"able stock price risk is not necessarily monotonic.
To document the extent to which managerial ownership is endogenously determined by the contracting environment, we extend the empirical speci"cation used by Demsetz and Lehn by including a number of additional explanatory variables other than stock price variability (see also Kole, 1996) . Most importantly, we include variables (such as "rm size, capital intensity, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, cash #ow, and investment rate) designed to control for the scope for moral hazard. To the extent that our additional explanatory variables proxy for moral hazard, our speci"cation clari"es the role of stock price variance as an explanatory variable for managerial ownership. We also use panel data that allow us to estimate the importance of unobserved (time-invariant) "rm e!ects. These results show that a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is &explained' by unobserved "rm heterogeneity. In our subsequent analysis of the determinants of "rm value, we argue that this unobserved heterogeneity generates a spurious correlation between ownership and performance.
The second goal of this paper is to reexamine theoretical explanations of the empirical link between managerial ownership and "rm performance. M+rck et al. (1988) estimate a piecewise-linear relation between board ownership and Tobin's Q and "nd that Tobin's Q increases and then decreases with managerial ownership. McConnell and Servaes (1990) examine a larger data set than the Fortune 500 "rms examined by M+rck et al. and " nd an inverted U-shaped relation between Q and managerial ownership, with an in#ection point between 40% and 50% ownership. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) analyze 142 NYSE "rms and "nd that Q rises with ownership up to a stake of 1%; the relation is negative in the ownership range of 1}5%, becomes positive again in the ownership range of 5}20%, and turns negative for ownership levels exceeding 20%. The pattern identi"ed by M+rck et al. has been corroborated for a cross-section of U.S. "rms from 1935 by Holderness et al. (1999) . Kole (1995) examines the di!erences in data sources used in several recent studies and concludes that di!erences in "rm size can account for the reported di!erences between those studies. These studies generally interpret the positive relation at low levels of managerial ownership as evidence of incentive alignment, and the negative relation at high levels of managerial ownership as evidence that managers become &entrenched' and can indulge in non-value-maximizing activities without being disciplined by shareholders. However, these studies do not address the endogeneity problem that confronts the use of managerial ownership as an explanatory variable, a problem noted early by Jensen and Warner (1988, p. 13) .
We investigate the degree to which this heterogeneity makes managerial ownership an endogenous variable in models of "rm performance. Following in the tradition of Demsetz and Lehn, we describe the contracting problem faced by the "rm and develop a simple empirical model to illustrate the econometric issues that are encountered when estimating the relation among managerial ownership, its determinants, and its e!ect on "rm performance. Distinct from Demsetz and Lehn, and in contrast to previous papers that attempt to measure the impact of managerial ownership on "rm performance, we use panel data to test for the endogeneity of managerial ownership in models linking ownership to performance (measured by Tobin's Q). In particular, we use panel data to investigate the hypothesis that managerial ownership is related to observable and unobservable (to the econometrician) "rm characteristics in#uencing contracts. If the unobserved sources of "rm heterogeneity are relatively constant over time, we can treat these unobserved variables as "xed e!ects, and use panel data techniques to obtain consistent estimates of the parameter coe$cients. This approach provides consistent estimates of the residuals in the Q regression, which we use to construct a test for correlation between managerial ownership and unobserved "rm heterogeneity.
Our principal "ndings are threefold. First, proxies for the contracting environment faced by the "rm (i.e., observable "rm characteristics) strongly predict the structure of managerial ownership. We substantially extend the set of explanatory variables examined by Demsetz and Lehn, and we show that many of our results are robust to the inclusion of observed determinants of managerial ownership, industry "xed e!ects, or "rm "xed e!ects. Second, we show that the coe$cient on managerial ownership is not robust to the inclusion of "xed e!ects in the regression for Tobin's Q. Our formal statistical test rejects the null hypothesis of a zero correlation between managerial ownership and the unobserved determinants of Tobin's Q, thus supporting our conjecture that managerial ownership is endogenous in Q regressions. That is, managerial ownership and "rm performance are determined by common characteristics, some of which are unobservable to the econometrician. Third, we explore the use of instrumental variables as an alternative to "xed e!ects to control for the endogeneity of managerial ownership in the Q regression. We "nd some evidence to support a causal link from ownership to performance, but this evidence is tentative because of the weakness of our instruments. We argue that future progress will require a more structural approach to the model. Kole (1996) also argues that managerial ownership is endogenous; she further argues that causality operates in the opposite direction, from performance to ownership. Using a panel-data vector autoregression, we corroborate Kole's reverse causality evidence (results available upon request). Our research, however, supports the idea that both ownership and performance are determined by similar (observed and unobserved) variables in the "rm's contracting environment. Thus, our interpretation is di!erent from Kole's interpretation. That is, we "nd evidence endogeneity caused by unobserved heterogeneity as opposed to reverse causality. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline a simple model of managerial ownership and explain why it is di$cult to estimate the relation between managerial ownership levels and "rm performance, particularly in the context of cross-sectional data. Section 3 describes the sample selection criteria and the data we use in our empirical analysis of managerial ownership and "rm performance. In Sections 4 and 5, respectively, we present empirical evidence on the determinants of managerial ownership and on the relation between managerial ownership and "rm performance. Section 6 concludes.
2. An empirical framework for analyzing executive contracts A common approach for estimating the impact of managerial ownership on "rm value is to regress Tobin's Q on such variables as the percentage of equity held by managers. In this section, we argue that this regression is potentially misspeci"ed because of the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. Speci"cally, if some of the unobserved determinants of Tobin's Q are also determinants of managerial ownership, then managerial ownership might spuriously appear to be a determinant of "rm performance. To motivate our focus on the endogeneity of managerial ownership, we provide three examples of likely sources of unobservable heterogeneity, and in each case, we discuss their econometric consequences for cross-sectional regressions. We follow this discussion with a more formal exposition, in which we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is a &"rm "xed e!ect', and we show how, under this assumption, panel data can be used to mitigate the endogeneity problem. In Section 5, we return to this model to describe a test for the endogeneity of ownership in regressions for Tobin's Q.
For our "rst example of unobserved heterogeneity, consider two "rms that are identical except that the owner of one of the "rms has access to a superior monitoring technology. Under the optimal contracting regime, the owners with access to the superior monitoring technology will choose a lower level of managerial ownership to align incentives, and this "rm will have a higher valuation because fewer resources will be diverted to managerial perquisites. If measures of the quality of the monitoring technology are omitted from the speci"cation, a regression of "rm value on managerial ownership will spuriously (and falsely) indicate a negative relation, because ownership is a negative proxy for the quality of monitoring technology.
Intangible assets provide a second example of unobserved "rm heterogeneity. Suppose two "rms are identical except that one of the "rms operates with a higher fraction of its assets in the form of intangibles. Under the optimal contracting regime, the owners of this "rm will require a higher level of managerial ownership to align incentives because the intangible assets are harder to monitor and therefore subject to managerial discretion. This "rm will also have a higher Q value because the market will value intangibles in the numerator (market value), but the book value of assets in the denominator will understate the value of intangibles (because Tobin's Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of the "rm's outstanding debt and equity divided by the book value of assets). In this example, the unobserved level of intangibles induces a positive correlation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q, but this relation is spurious, not causal.
A third example of unobserved heterogeneity is variation in the degree of market power. Suppose there are two "rms competing in a market with di!erentiated products and that one "rm enjoys a competitive advantage because (for some historical reason) it has been able to locate its products in such a way that confers more market power. If this market power insulates managerial decision-making from the discipline of competitive product markets, then the optimal contract for managers will call for higher levels of managerial ownership. Hence, unobserved heterogeneity in the form of unobserved di!erences in market power will (spuriously) induce a positive relation between ownership and performance. Alternatively, causation could run the other way; stockholders might design the manager's compensation to implicitly encourage collusive outcomes in the product market (Fershtman and Judd, 1987) . Attempting to test this proposition using regressions of Tobin's Q on managerial ownership su!ers from the same econometric problems we study here. The ownership decision is endogenous because of unobserved "rm heterogeneity.
It is possible to generalize these examples in a simple analytical framework. We assume that within the general set of contracts agreed to by the "rm, the owners of the "rm choose a simple management compensation contract that includes a share of the "rm's equity. This equity share (or &managerial stake') is chosen to maximize the owners' equity return subject to incentive compatibility and participation constraints. For this purpose, we assume that gains from other means for reducing agency costs have been maximized, so that we examine the residual agency cost to be addressed by managerial ownership (we revisit this assumption in Section 5 below). Let x GR and u GR , respectively, denote observable and unobservable characteristics for "rm i at time t related to the "rm's contracting environment (including, e.g., proxies for the potential for moral hazard). In addition to unobserved "rm characteristics, we implicitly assume a pro"tability shock that is observable to the manager, but not to outside shareholders. This shock cannot be contracted upon, giving rise to moral hazard.
The "rm's owners must decide how much equity to give to managers in order to align incentives for value maximization. This equity share m GR depends on such factors as the potential for moral hazard and managers' exposure to risk, which we assume are partly measured by x GR , but are otherwise unobserved and included in u GR . We assume that the functional relation is linear, and that u GR "u G is time-invariant for the "rm, so that
where e GR represents independent measurement error. Faced with this contract, managers choose an optimal &e!ort level', y GR , which could include a range of participation in non-value-maximizing activities. This e!ort choice depends on the managerial ownership stake, m GR , and, like the optimal contract itself, depends on both observed and unobserved characteristics of the "rm, x GR and u G . Assuming a linear functional form, we can represent the manager's e!ort choice by the following relation:
Using "rm value as a summary measure of expected "rm performance, we assume that "rm value depends on managerial e!ort plus the vector of observed and unobserved "rm characteristics. Denoting the value of "rm i at time t by Q GR , we assume that
We can now combine Eqs. (2) and (3) to derive the following relation among "rm managerial ownership, "rm characteristics, and "rm performance:
Simplifying the notation reveals the regression speci"cation commonly used in the empirical literature:
In a cross-section of "rms, as long as the error term,
} is uncorrelated with both m GR and x GR , one can consistently estimate the reduced-form coe$cient on managerial ownership in the regression for "rm value. However, because the choice of managerial ownership depends on unobserved "rm characteristics, m GR depends on u G , and is therefore correlated with G . Speci"cally,
In general, the expectation in Eq. (6) will be zero only in the unlikely event that the optimal contract does not depend on observed "rm characteristics ( "0), or in the event that neither e!ort nor Q GR do ( " "0). Hence one cannot estimate Eq. (5) using ordinary least squares. A natural solution to this problem would be to use instrumental variables for ownership, but this approach is di$cult in practice because the natural instruments } the observed "rm characteristics x GR } are already included on the right-hand side of the equation for "rm valuation in Eq. (5). Hence it is di$cult to identify instrumental variables that would permit identi"cation of a . With panel data, however, one can use a "xed-e!ects estimator, assuming that the unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time.
In contrast to the model for Tobin's Q, the model for the optimal choice of managerial ownership levels in Eq. (1) is more easily identi"ed because it requires only the much weaker assumption that the unobserved "rm characteristics are uncorrelated with observed characteristics. Hence the focus of our results in Section 4 is on Eq. (1).
The above discussion suggests four lines of empirical inquiry. First, we explore whether the observed "rm characteristics (proxies for the potential for moral hazard and risk) in#uence managerial ownership in ways that are consistent with theoretical predictions. Second, we investigate the importance of unobserved characteristics as determinants of managerial ownership. Third, we investigate the extent to which the empirical relation between managerial ownership and "rm performance (measured by Tobin's Q) can be explained by the omission of observed and unobserved "rm characteristics (i.e., by uncontrolled-for or unobserved heterogeneity). Fourth, we explore the possibility of using instrumental variables to recover the parameter values in Eq. (5). We describe these results in Sections 4 and 5 after describing our sample and data in Section 3.
The data
Our sample consists of "rms from the Compustat universe. We restrict ourselves to "rms that have no missing data (on sales, the book value of capital, and the stock price) over the three-year period 1982}1984. (We cannot avoid this conditioning because we cannot use "rms with missing data or fewer than three years of data for the variables of interest.) We then select 600 "rms by random sampling, and we collect data for all subsequent periods. Our panel is therefore balanced at 600 "rms from 1982 through 1984, but the number of "rms declines to 551 by 1985, and falls to a low of 330 by 1992, the last year in the sample. Because of this attrition from Compustat (principally due to mergers and acquisitions), our panel is systematically less random over time. However, we avoid exacerbating the scope for sampling bias by not requiring a balanced panel.
For this unbalanced panel of "rms, we attempt to collect the following additional data for each "rm-year observation: the number of top managers and directors (as reported in the proxy statement), the percentage of the "rm's shares owned by those managers and directors, and the date of the proxy statement from which these two numbers are collected. For those observations for which we can locate proxy statements, we collect the managerial ownership variables and merge this information with the Compustat data. Because smaller "rms (in Table 1 Sample of Compustat "rms by year
We start out with 600 "rms randomly sampled from the universe of Compustat "rms with data available over the period 1982}1984 on sales, book value of capital, and stock price. The number of "rms declines after 1984, principally due to mergers and acquisitions. The number of available ownership observations represents "rms for which we are able to obtain proxy statements with the number of top managers and directors and their collective percentage share ownership. terms of the number of shareholders) are not required to "le proxies with the Securities and Exchange Commission, we are unable to obtain proxy information for all "rms. We end up with managerial ownership information for about 70% of the Compustat "rms. Table 1 summarizes the number of "rms in our sample as a result of the sample selection process. Despite the problems of attrition and proxy availability (which are not unique to our study), our sample provides several distinct advantages over datasets used in previous studies. First, in contrast to studies that focus on the Fortune 1000, our sample includes a much larger number of small "rms and is more representative of the typical "rm in Compustat. Second, we have a panel of "rms rather than a single cross-section. This allows us to control for "rm-level "xed e!ects. Third, we deliberately construct our panel in such a way that we can control for sample selection bias because of lack of data (for ownership) and attrition. In fact, it is possible to describe the signi"cance of the bias imposed on the level of managerial ownership by a requirement that the panel be balanced; looking over the 1982}1992 period, the average ownership share varies from 16.2% to 19.4%, and for the balanced panel, for the "rms removed by the balancing criterion, the ownership share varies between 22.4% and 25.3%. The availability of data on managerial ownership is well predicted by variables such as "rm size and "xed capital intensity, but as we explain in our discussion of empirical results, controlling for this &missing data bias' does not qualitatively a!ect our results. While our sample design allows us to estimate and control for the e!ects of attrition bias, exit from Compustat due to mergers and acquisitions or bankruptcies is, in practice, di$cult to predict using observable "rm characteristics. A simple probit model for exit reveals that size is the principal explanatory variable; many more "rms exit because of mergers than because of failure. When we include the inverse Mills ratio in our Q regressions, we "nd no statistically signi"cant e!ect of selection bias. We therefore decide not to correct formally for attrition bias.
To illustrate di!erences between small and large "rms, Table 2 shows, by size class, the average number of managers per "rm and the percentage of shares outstanding owned collectively by those managers in 1982. The frequency distributions of managerial ownership and the number of managers are reported in Fig. 1 . Note that the percentage of shares owned by insiders is much higher for small "rms, measuring 32% on average for "rms in (roughly) the bottom third of the size distribution of "rms. By contrast, existing studies typically oversample large "rms, and report average ownership shares of approximately 10%. This "gure is consistent with the ownership stakes in "rms in the top third of our size distribution (for comparison, the sales cuto! for Fortune 1000 "rms is approximately $1 billion).
Determinants of managerial ownership: empirical evidence

Firm characteristics
The simple model outlined in Section 2 indicates the need to identify observable variables that relate to potential moral hazard and in#uence optimal managerial stakes. If the scope for managerial discretion di!ers across "rms according to observable di!erences in the composition of assets, then a prediction of the theory is that "rms with assets that are di$cult to monitor will have higher levels of managerial ownership. The speci"cation used by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) to explain ownership concentration includes stock price volatility and industry dummies, but does not include proxies for the scope for managerial discretion (though managerial discretion is one interpretation o!ered for stock price volatility). We extend their speci"cation by adding a large number of explanatory variables designed to proxy for the scope for managerial discretion, namely, size, capital intensity, cash #ow, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and gross investment rates. As we show below, this expanded variable set dramatically improves the R statistic, and the coe$cient estimates are all statistically di!erent from zero with the predicted signs.
Size. Firm size has an ambiguous e!ect a priori on the scope for moral hazard. On the one hand, monitoring and agency costs can be greater in large "rms, increasing desired managerial ownership. In addition, large "rms are likely to employ more skilled managers, who are consequently wealthier, suggesting a higher level of managerial ownership. On the other hand, large "rms might enjoy economies of scale in monitoring by top management and by rating agencies, leading to a lower optimal level of managerial ownership. We use the log of "rm sales,¸N(S), and its square, (¸N(S)), to measure size.
Scope for discretionary spending. To the extent that investments in "xed capital are observable and more easily monitored, "rms with a greater concentration of "xed or &hard' capital in their inputs will generally have a lower optimal level of managerial ownership (Gertler and Hubbard, 1988) . We use the "rm's capital-to-sales ratio, K/S, and its square, (K/S), as measures of the relative importance of hard capital in the "rm's technology.
Beyond hard capital, other "rm spending is more discretionary and less easily monitored. The greater the role of these &soft capital' inputs in the "rm's technology, all else being equal, the higher is the desired level of managerial ownership. By including the capital-to-sales ratio, we have controlled (inversely) for soft capital, but some soft capital is &softer' than others and hence more vulnerable to managerial discretion. To re"ne our proxies for the scope for discretionary spending, we use the ratio of R&D spending to capital, (R&D)/K, the ratio of advertising spending to capital, A/K, and dummy variables for whether the "rm reports R&D spending (RD;M) and advertising spending (AD;M) in that year. We include dummy variables when R&D and advertising are missing to control for the possibility that nonreporting "rms are discretely di!erent from reporting "rms. By far the most common reason for not complying with the disclosure requirement is that the level of R&D or advertising expenditure is negligible. Simply eliminating observations with missing values for these variables is undesirable because it signi"cantly reduces the sample size and biases the sample in favor of R&D-intensive and advertising "rms.
As a proxy for the link between high growth and opportunities for discretionary projects, we use the "rm's investment rate measured by the ratio of capital expenditures to the capital stock, I/K. Finally, we use the ratio of operating income to sales >/S to measure market power or a "rm's &free cash #ow' (the di!erence between cash #ow and spending on value-enhancing investment projects). As suggested by Jensen (1986) , the higher is a "rm's free cash #ow, all else being equal, the higher is the desired level of managerial ownership. While free cash #ow is itself unobservable, it is presumably correlated with operating income.
Managerial risk aversion. Because higher managerial ownership levels, all else being equal, imply less portfolio diversi"cation for managers, the optimal contract involves a tradeo! between diversi"cation and incentives for performance. The higher is the "rm's idiosyncratic risk, the lower is optimal managerial ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) o!er a second interpretation of this relation, suggesting that higher volatility indicates more scope for managerial discretion and thereby increases equilibrium managerial ownership levels. Unlike their speci"cation, ours includes measures of intangible capital to control for managerial discretion. We therefore focus on the "rst interpretation of risk. As an empirical proxy for volatility, we use the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of daily stock prices (constructed from residuals from a standard CAPM regression), denoted by SIGMA, although our results are not qualitatively changed by the substitution of total stock return variance for our de"nition of SIGMA. Analogous to our treatment of missing values of (R&D)/K and A/K, we set missing values of SIGMA equal to zero, and then also include in the regression a dummy variable SIGDUM equal to unity when SIGMA is not missing, and zero otherwise.
To deal with zero-volume trading days in the daily data, we construct n-day returns by summing the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily returns over the days in the period to create an approximate n-day return. We then divide this return (as well as n-day returns created by weekends and holidays) by the number of days in the period to obtain an average daily return. The variance of this average return will equal the variance of the daily return, and the same will be true for the idiosyncratic variance in a CAPM regression. Converting n-day returns to average daily returns thus removes the heteroskedasticity introduced by combining n-day-return observations with daily returns. Out of our initial universe of 600 "rms for the 1984 period, the CRSP NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ daily "les contains 525 "rms reporting returns in 1984. Of these, there are 502 "rms with enough data to construct at least 20 observations on daily returns using only days for which trading volume is positive.
In addition to the problem of days with zero trading volume, there are days for which closing prices are not available, or days for which CRSP uses the average of the closing bid}ask spread instead of the closing price. This introduces nonclassical measurement error into the return calculation, which could bias our ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of beta, return variance, and residual variance. To check the robustness of our results, we experiment with smaller samples that include only "rms for which we can construct at least 20 observations based on (i) positive trading volume and (ii) transactions prices rather than the average of bid}ask prices. This substantially reduces the sample in 1984 to 328 "rms (from 502). In practice, however, the results do not di!er qualitatively from the larger sample. Hence, we report results in the paper using the larger sample, which, for many "rms, relies on the closing average of the bid}ask spread rather than an actual closing price.
While we have addressed the most obvious examples of nonsynchronous trading (namely, days on which no trading occurs or on which CRSP cannot obtain a valid transaction price), there remain days on which CRSP calculates returns using the last price transacted rather than the closing price. As Scholes and Williams (1976) , among others, point out, the inclusion of nonsynchronous trading days produces biased OLS estimates of beta. To check the robustness of our results against the possibility of biased beta estimates due to nonsynchronous trading days, we follow the approach recommended by Dimson (1979) by including leads and lags of the market return in the beta regression. These additional regressors are occasionally signi"cant for some "rms in some years, but using the alternative estimates of the idiosyncratic variance does not materially a!ect our results.
Summary. Combining these observable variables associated with moral hazard yields the following reduced-form expression for managerial ownership:
where i and t represent the "rm and time, respectively, u G is a "rm-speci"c e!ect, and GR is a white-noise error term. Our list of variables is summarized in Table 3 . Table 4A reports our estimates of the determinants of managerial stakes. The dependent variable in each case is¸N(m/(1!m)). Each of the speci"cations includes year dummies (not reported). In speci"cations including "xed "rm e!ects, we control for the unobserved "rm heterogeneity represented by u G in Eq. (6).
Evidence
The "rst column reports results from a baseline speci"cation using pooled data for all "rm-years. Increases in "rm size, all else being equal, are associated with a reduction in managerial stakes. Increases in "xed capital intensity (which Table 3 Variable descriptions
Q
Tobin's Q, that is, the ratio of the value of the "rm divided by the replacement value of assets. For "rm value, we use the market value of common equity plus the estimated market value of preferred stock (roughly estimated as ten times the preferred dividend) plus the book value of total liabilities, and for replacement value of assets we use the book value of total assets. This de"nition is closely related to the market-to-book ratio, which is easily seen by subtracting total liabilities from both the numerator and denominator m
The total common equity holdings of top-level managers as a fraction of common equity outstanding m The average common equity holdings per manager. This number is calculated as the market value of common equity times the fraction held by top managers divided by the number of top managers
LN(S)
The natural log of sales, used to measure "rm size (Ln(S))
The
square of LN(S), included to allow for nonlinearities in LN(S) K/S
The ratio of tangible, long-term assets (property, plant, and equipment) to sales, used to measure the alleviation of agency problems due to the fact that such assets are easily monitored and provide good collateral (K/S)
square of K/S, included to allow for nonlinearities in K/S Y/S
The ratio of operating income to sales, used to proxy for market power and measure the gross cash #ows available from operations SIGMA The standard deviation of idiosyncratic stock price risk, calculated as the standard error of the residuals from a CAPM model estimated using daily data for the period covered by the annual sample SIGDUM A dummy variable equal to unity if the data required to estimated SIGMA is available, and otherwise equal to zero (if SIGMA is missing). To maintain sample size and reduce the risk of sample selection bias, we set missing observations of SIGMA equal to zero, and then include this dummy variable to allow the intercept term to capture the mean of the SIGMA for missing values
R&D/K
The ratio of research and development expenditures to the stock property, plant, and equipment, used to measure the role of &R&D capital' relative to other non-"xed assets RDUM A dummy variable equal to unity if R&D data were available, and otherwise equal to zero (see
the de"nition of SIGDUM) A/K
The ratio of advertising expenditures to the stock of property, plant, and equipment, used to measure the role of &advertising capital' relative to other non-"xed assets ADUM A dummy variable equal to unity if R&D data were available, and otherwise equal to zero. For usage details, see the de"nition of SIGDUM I/K
The ratio of capital expenditures to the stock of property, plant, and equipment we associate with lower monitoring costs) also lead to a decline in managerial stakes. Among our proxies for discretionary spending (R&D, advertising, investment rates, and operating income relative to capital), R&D intensity appears to have a negative e!ect on ownership stakes, while advertising intensity, operating The speci"cations reported in the second and third columns of Table 4A control for unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level and "rm level, respectively. The second column includes "xed three-digit SIC e!ects; the third column includes "xed "rm e!ects. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) included controls for certain (regulated) industries. By including "xed industry e!ects (and, in some cases, "xed "rm e!ects), we control for industry in#uences generally. The inclusion of "xed e!ects changes the estimated coe$cients signi"cantly in some cases. For example, if we do not control for unobserved industry-level or "rm-level heterogeneity, the estimated coe$cients on size and investment rate are signi"cantly larger in absolute value, and the estimated coe$cient of the ratio of R&D spending to capital changes sign. These di!erences suggest that the unobserved "rm characteristics are correlated with the observed characteristics, and therefore bias the estimated coe$cients in a cross-sectional or pooled regression. For example, in a univariate regression, if there were a strong positive equilibrium relation between R&D intensity and managerial ownership, excluding "rm "xed e!ects would bias downward the estimated coe$cient on R&D/K in a pooled regression.
The fourth and "fth columns of Table 4A report results from splitting the sample according to whether the "rm is in the Fortune 500 in the given year (including "rm-level "xed e!ects). Some subsample di!erences emerge. The negative e!ect of idiosyncratic risk (measured by SIGMA) on ownership is traced to non-Fortune 500 "rms, consistent with our earlier interpretation. E!ects of capital intensity, operating income, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and the investment rate are larger in absolute value for larger "rms.
Because theoretical models generally emphasize managerial ownership levels relative to the managers' wealth and not simply the fraction of "rm equity held by managers, we present in Table 4B results from the same models presented in Table 4A , but with the dependent variable being the log of managerial equity per manager. (We do not observe managerial wealth, so we focus only on managerial equity.) Broadly speaking, the patterns we identi"ed in Table 4A carry over to the estimates in Table 4B . One di!erence is that the estimated coe$cient on the capital-to-sales ratio is everywhere positive and statistically signi"cantly di!erent from zero. This could re#ect the fact that capital-intensive "rms employ relatively fewer workers and managers, but have higher levels of value added per worker, and hence derive larger incentive bene"ts from higher levels of managerial ownership.
Taken together, the results presented in Table 4A and B suggest strongly that observable "rm characteristics in the contracting environment in#uence managerial ownership. In addition, unobserved "rm characteristics are correlated with observed characteristics, making coe$cients estimated using panel data more reliable than those estimated using cross-sectional data. The bene"cial ownership data include options exercisable within 60 days, but omit recent awards that are not yet vested. Because we lack data on all of the stock options
We are grateful to Andrew Samwick for this calculation.
granted to all top managers, we do not investigate the substitutability of direct ownership stakes and stock options as mechanisms to align incentives for value maximization. In the ExecuComp data over the 1992}1996 period, however, the correlation between the pay-performance sensitivity for managers using the &stock' de"nition and the pay-performance sensitivity using the stock plus options de"nition exceeds 0.95. Thus our focus on the bene"cial ownership data appears warranted.
Managerial ownership and 5rm performance
Evidence on the exogeneity of managerial ownership
Thus far, we have emphasized that managerial stakes are part of a larger set of equilibrium contracts undertaken by the "rm to align incentives for value maximization, and we have shown that managerial ownership can be explained by observable characteristics of the "rm's contracting environment, such as stock price volatility and the composition of assets, as predicted by the contracting view. These results also show, however, that even when industry dummies are included, many important features of the "rm's contracting environment remain unobserved. Speci"cally, including "rm-level "xed dummy variables raises the adjusted R from 0.584 to 0.884. These results cast doubt on the assumption that managerial ownership is exogenous in regressions that attempt to measure the impact of ownership on performance by regressing variables like Tobin's Q on managerial ownership without controlling for "xed e!ects.
In this section, we use panel data techniques to investigate more directly the question of whether managerial ownership can be treated as exogenous in the performance regressions. We use Tobin's Q as our measure of "rm performance, but our results are robust to using return on assets as the dependent variable (tables are available upon request). To investigate the impact of managerial ownership on Q, we use variants of the reduced-form model in Eq. (3), in which Q depends upon managerial ownership, m, observable "rm characteristics, x, and unobserved "rm characteristics, u. We use two speci"cations of managerial ownership in the Q regression. The "rst includes m and m (see McConnell and Servaes, 1990) . The second includes three piecewise-linear terms in m (as in M+rck et al., 1988 For observable characteristics, we use the same vector of x variables used in the model for managerial ownership. We report results including and excluding arguably endogenous &investment' variables (R&D, advertising, and "xed capital). Our empirical analysis of the e!ects of managerial ownership and "rm characteristics on Q is summarized in Table 5A and B. Table 5A reports estimated coe$cients for cases in which managerial ownership is represented by m and m. Table 5B reports estimated coe$cients for cases in which managerial ownership is represented by the piecewise-linear terms, m1, m2, and m3. For both of the above speci"cations, we report estimated coe$cients for (1) regressions with managerial ownership alone (pooled, SIC3 industry e!ects, and "rm e!ects), (2) the regressions including the full set of x variables (pooled, SIC3 industry e!ects, and "rm e!ects), and (3) the regressions including the noninvestment set of x variables. All speci"cations include year e!ects (not reported).
Turning "rst to the quadratic speci"cations of managerial ownership in Table 5A , we note that the managerial ownership variables are statistically signi"cant only in the pooled model with no other variables and in the model with only industry e!ects. In other speci"cations, the managerial ownership coe$cients are virtually never statistically signi"cantly di!erent from zero. (The Wald test for the joint signi"cance of m and m is reported at the bottom of the table.) Once we control for observed "rm characteristics (x), or for unobserved "rm characteristics (in the "rm-"xed-e!ect version of u), there is no e!ect of changes in managerial ownership on Q. Though not reported in Table 5A , these results hold for both the Fortune 500 and non-Fortune 500 subsamples considered earlier.
Turning to the spline speci"cations for managerial ownership in Table 5B , the pooled results are consistent with those of M+rck et al. (1988) , who "nd that the impact of m on Q increases at a decreasing rate, and thereafter declines. In contrast to the quadratic speci"cation for managerial ownership, the M+rck}Shleifer}Vishny speci"cation is robust to the inclusion of observable contracting determinants and industry dummies. Once we control for x variables and for u (via "rm "xed e!ects), however, changes in managerial ownership levels have no statistically signi"cant e!ect on Q. These results hold both for the Fortune 500 and non-Fortune 500 subsamples investigated earlier.
The results reported in Table 5A and B con"rm the intuition of the contracting example sketched in Section 2. First, the results obtained when observed characteristics (x) are included suggest that previously asserted relations between Q and m in part re#ect equilibrium relations among Q and "rm characteristics in the "rm's contracting problem. Second, to the extent that "rm characteristics unobserved by the econometrician in#uence the "rm's contracts and the equilibrium level of managerial ownership, the coe$cient on m in a Q regression (when no attempt is made to incorporate the unobserved heterogeneity) is biased. Third, in keeping with our emphasis on contracting, the relations we estimate suggest that no inference can be made about the e!ect of &exogenous' local increases in managerial ownership on "rm performance.
One can formalize this evidence against the exogeneity of managerial ownership by testing for a correlation between the "xed e!ect and managerial ownership. We could use a Hausman (1978) test, but this test would tend to over-reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation because it would tend to reject if any of the explanatory variables were correlated with the "xed e!ect. To reduce this Type I error, we construct a more precise &conditional moment' test, which is in the spirit of a Hausman test, but tends to reject only if managerial ownership is the source of the speci"cation error (Greene, 1997, p. 534; Newey, 1985) .
The test is constructed as follows. Let the performance model be
where z GR includes the managerial ownership variables and the x variables described earlier, and u G is the "rm "xed e!ect. The formal hypothesis we want to test is whether the unobserved "xed e!ect, u G , is correlated with managerial ownership, an element of z GR . That is, H : E(m GR ) u G )"0, where m GR is an r;1 vector of variables measuring the e!ect of managerial ownership. The idea of the test is to construct the simple analogue to the population moment, s"E(m GR w GR ), and then to test whether it is statistically signi"cantly di!erent from zero.
Using a consistent &within' estimator of , we can construct consistent estimates of the residual w
G is the number of observations for "rm i. Under standard regularity conditions and under the null hypothesis that E(m GR ) u G )"0, (Ns( will be asymptotically distributed N(0, ). Therefore the statistic k"Ns( K \s( is asymptotically chi-squared with r degrees of freedom, where K is a consistent estimate of (for more details, see Greene, 1997) . Table 5 (A) Determinants of "rm value (Tobin's Q),
The speci"cations reported in this table all model "rm value, Q, as a linear function of the explanatory variables indicated below. In this table, the in#uence of m enters as a quadratic function. Intercept terms and year dummies are included for all regressions, but not reported. Fixed e!ects at the industry or "rm level are included where indicated, but not reported. Variable de"nitions for the acronyms are given in Table 3 .
Variable The p-values for this test statistic are reported in Table 5A and B. In both tables, the p-values tend to be lower for the tests based on industry-level "xed-e!ects estimator. This presumably re#ects the higher test power generally implied by the greater e$ciency of the slope estimates. The rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity of managerial ownership is particularly strong for the spline speci"cation reported in Table 5B . These results strongly suggest that reported results using such a speci"cation are subject to endogeneity bias.
An important caveat to all empirical work using "xed-e!ect estimators on panel data is that the &within' estimator can, under a range of certain circumstances identi"ed by Griliches and Hausman (1986) , exacerbate the bias toward zero caused by measurement error. If our ownership variable were measured with classical error, then this would reduce the power of our Wald test for the joint signi"cance of the ownership variables, and would invalidate the distributional assumptions for our test statistic due to the inconsistency of the residual estimates. While it is always possible to make an a priori case for measurement error, there is little empirical evidence that measurement error is a serious problem in our data. Table 4A and B show, for example, that the within variation in managerial ownership is signi"cantly correlated with the explanatory variables, a result that does not square with serious measurement error. In addition, the within-"rm point estimates of the ownership coe$cients in Table 5A and B are not obviously biased toward zero, as measurement error would suggest. Finally, the conditions identi"ed by Griliches and Hausman might not hold. If the variance of the measurement error were primarily cross-sectional rather than within, then the within estimator would actually tend to reduce the bias e!ects of measurement error. We nevertheless recognize the limitations of the within estimator, and in the next section, we report instrumental variables estimated as an alternative approach to deal with the endogeneity of ownership variables.
Toward a more structural interpretation of contracting relations
The strength of the empirical evidence against the exogeneity of managerial ownership suggests that more model structure is required to identify the impact of managerial ownership on "rm value. A standard remedy would be to use an instrumental variable in the regression for "rm value. In a related paper, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) recognize a similar endogeneity problem and use lagged explanatory variables as instruments for managerial ownership. They "nd that the instrumental variable estimator increases the magnitude of the ownership e!ect on "rm value. Hermalin and Weisbach report that a Hausman speci"cation test rejects the exogeneity assumption. While this rejection provides evidence of endogenous ownership, it does not validate their choice of instruments. If omitted "rm characteristics are the source of the endogeneity (as we have argued above), and if these unobserved "rm characteristics change slowly over time (as we have also argued above), then lagged explanatory variables will su!er as much from the endogeneity problem as do contemporaneous ones.
Instrumental variables for managerial ownership are di$cult to "nd. The basic problem is that for any variable that plausibly determines the optimal level of managerial ownership, it is also possible to argue that the same variable might plausibly a!ect Tobin's Q. For example, our results in Table 4A and B showed that market power (as measured by operating margins) is a candidate instrument. However, even though it is correlated with managerial ownership, it also determines the equilibrium value of Tobin's Q, and therefore must appear independently in this regression. Additional candidates suggested by these results, such as the capital-to-sales ratio, advertising, R&D, and "xed investment, are also invalid because of links between investment and Q and because intangible assets are conservatively valued on the balance sheet, therefore in#uencing the level of Tobin's Q.
A more plausible case can be made for using "rm size and stock price volatility as instruments. It is possible to construct arguments under which either variable could be correlated with Tobin's Q. For example, suppose that high Q values re#ect future growth opportunities. Such "rms might generally be smaller (or larger), and might also have more volatile stock prices due to the greater uncertainty about future growth prospects. However, these arguments seem weaker than the arguments against operating margins, the capital-to-sales ratio, advertising, R&D, and investment. Moreover, in studies of "xed investment, it is generally argued that deviations of Tobin's Q from its equilibrium value are explained by the costs of adjusting the capital stock, and that these adjustment costs are proportional to the rate of investment. Therefore, the inclusion of advertising and R&D intensity and the investment rate should control for future growth opportunities. This argument eliminates the a priori case for including the size and volatility variables in the Q equation, and thus provides an argument for omitting these variables from the Q equation and using them as instruments for managerial ownership instead.
The results using¸N(S), (¸N(S)), SIGMA, and SIGDUM as instruments are reported in Table 6 . We use the more parsimonious quadratic speci"cation for managerial ownership to reduce the number of instruments required for identi-"cation. The "rst column of Table 6 reports the results of pooling without controlling for industry or "rm e!ects. In contrast to Table 5A , these results con"rm a large and statistically signi"cant inverse-U relation between ownership and "rm value. The coe$cients of 6.29 and !10.8 on m and m, respectively, imply an in#ection point of about 0.58. Given the distribution of managerial ownership shown in Fig. 1 , Tobin's Q is generally an increasing, concave function of m.
The second and third columns of Table 6 show that these results are robust to the inclusion of three-digit industry e!ects, but not to "rm e!ects. In both speci"cations, the standard errors rise substantially, rendering the coe$cients statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, this need not be interpreted as bad news for the results reported in the "rst column. One cannot reject the hypothesis that the "rm e!ects are jointly zero, though one can reject that the industry e!ects are jointly zero (the p-values on the associated Hausman tests are 0.208 for the test of pooled versus the inclusion of "rm e!ects and 0.00002 for the test of pooled versus the inclusion of industry e!ects). This conclusion has intuitive appeal because, by using instrumental variables, we have presumably controlled for the endogeneity that was the motivation for including "rm "xed e!ects. However, it is more likely that the combined e!ect of using instrumental variables and controlling for "xed e!ects has reduced the precision of estimates to the point at which such a test would have little power. We believe that the results in Table 6 represent a promising step toward the construction of more complete models of the relation between managerial ownership and "rm performance.
Conclusions
Firms are governed by a network of relations representing contracts for "nancing, capital structure, and managerial ownership and compensation, among others. For any of these contractual arrangements, it is di$cult to identify the correspondence between the contractual choice and "rm performance (e.g., measured by accounting rates of return or Tobin's Q) because contractual choices and performance outcomes are endogenously determined by exogenous and only partly observed features of the "rm's contracting environment.
We confront this endogeneity problem in the context of the "rm's compensation contract with managers. Because managerial equity stakes are an important and well-known mechanism used to align the incentives of managers and owners, we examine the determinants of managerial ownership as a function of the contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by variables describing the contracting environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models.
We "nd that a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved "rm heterogeneity. This unobserved heterogeneity in the contracting environment has important implications for econometric models designed to estimate the e!ect of managerial ownership on "rm performance. Our empirical analysis shows that existing results are not robust to controls for endogeneity induced by time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, once we control both for observed "rm characteristics and "rm "xed e!ects, it becomes di$cult to conclude that changes in "rm managerial ownership a!ect performance. Our instrumental-variables results, however, suggest a promising step toward the construction of more complete models of the relation between managerial ownership and "rm performance.
To take these observations one step further, we believe that the Q model results reported in Table 5A and B can be interpreted as supporting more generally the notion that the "rm chooses among alternative mechanisms for minimizing agency costs. This is, of course, the concept articulated in Alchian (1969); Fama (1980) ; Fama and Jensen (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) ; more recently, see Crutchley and Hansen (1989) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) .
Suppose, for example, that Q capitalizes the market's expectation of the e!ect of agency costs on "rm value. The loss in value re#ects residual agency costs, or agency costs remaining after corporate control mechanisms are chosen. In addition to managerial ownership choices emphasized here, alternative means of reducing agency costs include leverage (Jensen, 1986; Gertler and Hubbard, 1993) , increased reliance on outside directors (American Law Institute, 1982; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998) , large shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) , institutional investors, dividend policy (Easterbrook, 1984) , and radical changes in corporate control (Kaplan, 1989) .
One can interpret the results in Table 5A , B, and 6 as reduced-form exercises in which the x variables and the "rm "xed e!ects are determinants of the use of these mechanisms. For example, Gertler and Hubbard (1993) relate leverage in this context to the relative importance of "rm-speci"c and aggregate risk and proxies for the scope for moral hazard (variables captured by R&D and advertising intensity, year dummies, and "rm e!ects). Bene"ts from large shareholders likely depend on size or the relative importance of R&D (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) ; these channels are proxied through size, R&D intensity, and "rm e!ects. Institutional shareholdings likely depend on "rm size and whether the "rm is listed on the New York Stock Exchange (variables accounted for in part by "rm e!ects). The degree to which dividend policy can reduce agency costs depends on the importance of the scope for moral hazard (perhaps measured by idiosyncratic risk, R&D, or advertising) and the tax costs of paying dividends (measured in part by year and "rm e!ects). Net bene"ts of a major restructuring also are re#ected in proxies for moral hazard and "rm e!ects.
Two other possible strategies are tasks for future research. The "rst involves identifying large, arguably exogenous changes in ownership levels arising from shifts in tax policy, regulation, or "xed costs in the market for corporate control (Kaplan, 1989; Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Cole and Mehran, 1997) , though care must be taken because even certain &natural experiments' are endogenous in that they a!ect performance directly. The second involves designing a dynamic structural model of "rm contracting decisions, possibly permitting identi"cation from economically reasonable assumptions about functional form (Margiotta and Miller, 1991) . This strategy is particularly desirable given the lack of easily identi"ed instrumental variables.
While our "ndings are consistent with the proposition that "rms choose strategies to reduce agency costs optimally over the long run, at least two issues remain. First, the simultaneous choice of individual mechanisms or some subset needs to be modeled; subsets of these choices have been considered in a reduced-form setting, as in Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) ; Jensen et al. (1992) ; Moyer et al. (1992) ; Holthausen and Larcker (1993) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) . Second, the choice of mechanisms likely involves some "xed costs or &costs of adjustment' so that "rms are not always at their long-run contractual optimum. Exploring these costs and how they might have changed over time for di!erent agency-cost-reducing mechanisms is a particularly interesting task for future research.
